容量电价机制对发电商竞价行为的激励  

Stimulation of Capacity Pricing Mechanisms on Market Participants' Bidding Behaviors

作　　者：江健健[1] 康重庆[1] 夏清[1] 

机构地区：[1]清华大学电机系电力系统国家重点实验室,北京市海淀区100084

出　　处：《中国电机工程学报》2007年第31期83-88,共6页Proceedings of the CSEE

基　　金：霍英东教育基金会项目(104020)。

摘　　要：容量电价是调控电源投资和建设的一种宏观手段,还会对市场成员的竞价行为及电力市场交易产生影响。该文从激励的角度分析容量电价对市场成员竞价行为的影响,并利用基于报价中标概率信念函数的电力市场模拟方法,通过建立考虑容量电价因素的发电商个体新决策模型,定量研究和比较了国内两种不同容量电价补偿机制对发电商竞价行为和市场均衡状态的影响。理论分析和算例表明,按照中标容量支付容量电价,会抑制发电商的报价投机行为,使市场均衡价格较低。Generation capacity price is one of the macro mechanisms to control the investments and construction on generation sector. Generation capacity prices also impact on participants＇ bidding behaviors and the market equilibrium. From the aspect of institution stimulation, this paper analyzes the influences of capacity price on participants＇ bidding behaviors in electricity market： Furthermore, based on the BAP（bidding acceptance probability）-based electricity market simulation method, this paper establishes the new decision making models of GenCos, which involve the impacts of capacity prices. Finally, the different impacts of two main capacity pricing mechanisms in China on participants＇ bidding behaviors and market equilibrium are quantitatively studied and compared in this paper. Theoretical analysis and numerical examples show that the capacity payment bound with electricity trade results might depress the bidding speculation of GenCos and lower the equilibrimn price in electricity market.

关 键 词：电力市场 容量电价 市场模拟 市场均衡价格 

分 类 号：TM73[电气工程—电力系统及自动化]