集群中的企业信任机制研究——基于种群互相回报式合作行为博弈模型的分析  

Study on Trust Mechanism in Industrial Clusters——Analysis of Game Model Based on Biological Species Mutual Payback Behaviors

作　　者：刘友金[1] 徐尚昆[2] 田银华[1] 

机构地区：[1]湖南科技大学商学院,湖南湘潭411201 [2]中国人民大学商学院,北京100872

出　　处：《中国工业经济》2007年第11期56-63,共8页China Industrial Economics

基　　金：国家社会科学基金项目"集群视角的创新网络与区域国际竞争力研究"(批准号05BJL066);国家自然科学基金项目"基于行为生态学的企业技术创新集群行为研究"(批准号70372016);教育部新世纪优秀人才支持计划项目"基于创新网络的区域国际竞争力研究"(批准号NCET-04-0780)

摘　　要：近年来,有关信任及其作用机制受到了国内外学者的广泛关注和深入研究,但对于集群内企业信任机制的研究还处在起步阶段。本文引入行为生态学方法,通过构建种群互相回报式合作行为博弈模型,对这一问题展开了比较系统的讨论,得出了以下两点基本结论:种群互相回报式重复博弈使得守诺成为种群进化稳定对策,这构成了集群内企业信任机制产生的重要内在动因;集群内的"社会实施"有效地限制了企业的道德风险和机会主义行为,为信任在集群企业内的产生和维系创造了外部约束条件。Trust and its related functional mechanism have been widely concerned and scrutinized by both Chinese and overseas researchers over the last few years. However, the research on corporate trust mechanism within industrial clusters is still at its beginning stage. This study attempts to establish an analytical model to explore trust mechanism inside the industrial clusters from the perspective of biological species corporative behaviors. We have concluded from the particular discussion that, in the first place, the repeated game among biological scope the mutual payback enables the promise-keeping to be a stable solution in the evolution process, thus forms the internal motivational mechanism within the clusters; and in the second phase, the ＂community enforcement＂ oppose effective restrictions on corporate ethic risk and speculation, hence constitute external regulations for the emergence of credibility within the firms of the clusters.

关 键 词：集群 信任机制 合作行为 约束条件 

分 类 号：F406[经济管理—产业经济]