会计信息质量与公司治理:基于中国资本市场的进一步经验证据  

The Quality of Accounting Information and Corporate Governance:Some Empirical Evidence Underlying Chinese Capital Markets

作　　者：杜兴强[1] 周泽将[1] 

机构地区：[1]厦门大学管理学院会计系,福建厦门361005

出　　处：《财经论丛》2007年第3期71-79,共9页Collected Essays on Finance and Economics

基　　金：国家自然科学基金资助项目(70302012);教育部首届新世纪优秀人才支持计划(NCET-04-0596)

摘　　要：本文通过Jones模型计算出可操纵盈余,并以之作为会计信息质量的代理变量,验证了会计信息质量与公司治理各要素之间的关系,结果发现股东大会和董事会会议次数与盈余管理程度正相关,内外部审计机制并没有发挥保护股东的作用,管理层持股比例、两职分离与否、债务治理机制、独立董事比例以及法律环境对盈余管理程度并无显著影响。在划分为正负盈余管理的基础上,发现了第一大股东存在显著的掠夺动机。The paper analyses the relationship between accounting information quality and corporate goverance by the substitute variable of discretional accrual with Jones model. Research shows that the frequency of board and shareholder meetings is positive with.corporate governance; that internal and external auditing is out of the function and that other factors such as managers＇ stockholding proportion, boing seperated owners and managers or not, debt governance, proportion of independent directors and law factors are not significantly related. When all the samples are divided into positive earning management and negative earning management, the paper also finds entrenchment effect.

关 键 词：会计信息质量 公司治理 可操纵盈余 

分 类 号：F230[经济管理—会计学] F271[经济管理—国民经济]