公司治理、董事会规模与上市公司的实际控制  

Corporate Governance, Scale of the Board of Directors and the Practical Control of Listed Corporate

作　　者：汤洪波[1] 

机构地区：[1]广东金融学院中国金融转型与发展研究中心,广州510520

出　　处：《改革》2007年第11期95-101,共7页Reform

基　　金：国家自然科学基金项目“企业金融契约和劳动契约期限的互动关系研究”（批准号：70602033）.

摘　　要：最优合约理论和管理权力理论都从不同侧面对高管人员的激励报酬进行了解释，但都有不足。在分析和评述这两种理论的基础上，从公司治理角度，通过对公司治理与高管人员报酬的实证研究，发现在我国上市公司中公司治理机制的改进对高管人员报酬的影响正在逐步体现：当董事会规模大、流通股中机构投资者多、发行了外资股或实现了海外上市、公司的实际控制人为个人及公司规模扩大都能显著提高高管人员报酬；任职年限、ROA和独立董事占比与高管人员报酬正相关但不显著。The Optimal contracts theory and the Management Power Theory both explain compensation of the CEOs from different aspects, but both of them have some insufficiency. Based on analyzing and commenting the above two theory, and from the perspective of the Corporate Governance Theory, it carries out an empirical analysis of the relationship between the corporate governance and the compensation, and it is found in the analysis that the corporate governance improving is affecting CEO compensation gradually and it shows as the large scale of the beard of directors, the multitude of the institution investors in the liquid stock, the issuing of the foreign capital stock and listing of the company in the overseas market, the controlling of the enterprise by individuals and the scale of the enterprise all contribute to the compensation of the CEOs. The serving years in the company, ROA and the proportion of the independent board member are in indistinctive positive correlation with the compensation of the CEOs.

关 键 词：公司治理 报酬 合约 激励 

分 类 号：F832.33[经济管理—金融学]