面向EPR的政府及生产企业行为策略选择研究  

Strategies for Choice of EPR-Oriented Government and Production Enterprises' Behaviors Using Game Analysis

作　　者：赵一平[1] 朱庆华[1] 武春友[1] 

机构地区：[1]大连理工大学管理学院

出　　处：《管理学报》2007年第6期737-742,共6页Chinese Journal of Management

基　　金：国家自然科学基金资助项目(70202006);教育部PPP项目(D/05/06960);霍英东青年教师基金项目(91082)

摘　　要：以政府与核心企业为研究重点,通过构建两主体完全信息静态和动态EPR博弈模型,并对各因子的影响以及不同情境下的最优策略组合进行了比较分析,揭示了影响EPR的关键因素,以及在我国目前社会经济条件下实施EPR的有效措施和建议。The roles of government and core enterprises were focused. A static and dynamic ex- tended producer responsibility （EPR） game model with complete information was developed. The im- pacts of each factor in the model and the combinations of optional strategies under different scenarios were analyzed comparably. Key factors influencing ERP were explored. Some measures and sugges- tions for effectively carrying out ERP in China are also proposed.

关 键 词：生产者延伸责任制 博弈 影响因素 策略选择 

分 类 号：F2[经济管理—国民经济] F4