贸易摩擦过程中的策略行为——基于信号传递博弈的分析  

Tactics Behavior in Trade Friction

作　　者：朱彤[1] 李磊[1] 

机构地区：[1]南开大学经济学院国际经济研究所

出　　处：《财经科学》2007年第12期98-105,共8页Finance & Economics

摘　　要：本文就贸易摩擦中的策略行为进行了分析,建立了一个含有信号传递的三阶段博弈过程,分析了该博弈结局的四个均衡,并给出了贸易摩擦过程中信号传递有效的基本条件,最后就现实中的案例进行了解释与分析。本文研究表明,博弈过程中,一方(A国)的试探行为作为一种获取对方(B国)信息的手段是可行的,但必须满足本文的基本条件,该国才能够正确甄别B国的信息,否则试探是没有意义的,而B国的选择除了考虑A国的情况外,也应考虑自身的收益以传递出合适的信号。This paper sets up a three- stage signaling game model to analyze the attack and defense behavior in trade friction. After researching on the four types of equilibrium and the conditions for the effective application on the probe strategy in trade friction, we＇ ve made some explanations for two cases in real world. This paper indicates that it is feasible for the challenger to take the probe behavior to obtain the defender＇ s type under primary condition given out in this paper. Otherwise the result of the probing will not have any useful implication. The defender needs to send out the appropriate signals considering both the choice of challenger and the payoffs of himself.

关 键 词：贸易摩擦 信号传递 混同均衡 分离均衡 

分 类 号：F742[经济管理—国际贸易]