经理人股票期权无效性的动态非合作博弈分析  

A Dynamic Non-cooperative Game Analysis to the Invalidity of Stock Option to Senior Managers

作　　者：钱颜文[1] 杨洪焦[1] 孙林岩[1] 

机构地区：[1]西安交通大学管理学院

出　　处：《管理工程学报》2007年第4期7-13,23,共8页Journal of Industrial Engineering and Engineering Management

基　　金：国家863计划资助项目(2001AA11310)

摘　　要：大量学者从不同角度对经理人股票期权的有效性提出了质疑。本文基于现有理论和经验研究成果,分析股票期权收益的重要因素——继任经理人员的努力类型,对股票期权激励效果的影响,构建了经理人员股票期权激励合约的新框架,并建立经理人员之间的非合作动态博弈模型,有效解释了股票期权激励无效的内在原因。Many studies doubted the validity of stock option to senior managers, which focused on the efficiency of the external environment, the validity of stock market, to senior manager motivation contracts. This paper constructed a new analysis frame. With the five hypotheses, a dynamic non-cooperative game model between the former manager and the hold-over is constructed. Finding that the uncertainty of the residual claimant right from the stock option to the former manager is affected by the uncontrolled factor, the hold-over endeavor, which is the essential factor to the invalidity of stock option.

关 键 词：股票期权 委托代理 动态非合作博弈 一致性激励合约 

分 类 号：F830.91[经济管理—金融学] F224.32