基于Swarm的不同合约发电市场中多主体博弈仿真  

Multi-agent Game Simulation Based on Swarm in Electric Market with Different Contract Rate

作　　者：刘贞[1] 任玉珑[1] 唐松林[1] 丁亮[1] 

机构地区：[1]重庆大学经济与工商管理学院,重庆400030

出　　处：《管理工程学报》2007年第4期140-142,146,共4页Journal of Industrial Engineering and Engineering Management

基　　金：国家自然科学基金资助项目(90510016)

摘　　要：为了研究合约电量比率对政府税收、社会福利、市场规模及构成的影响,本文提出一种基于Swarm的不同合约发电市场中多主体博弈模型。通过该仿真模型可以得出结论:税收作为一种政府调节手段,随着合约电量比率的减少将变得更有效;当生产能力确定,合约电量比率增加到一定值,政府将不能通过调整税率使实际社会福利最大化;对于不同的合约电量比率,社会福利最大化下的电力市场规模及结构不同。In order to study the effect of contract volume rate on revenue, social welfare, market size and structure, the multi-agent game model based on swarm in electric market t with different contract is proposed. The simulation of the electric market shows ： The tax rate, as a regulation tool of government, will be more efficient when contract rate is decreasing. If the production capacity is fixed, the maximized social welfare cannot be acquired by adjusting tax rate when the contract rate raises some level, The market scale and structure for getting maximal social welfare are different when the contract rate is changed.

关 键 词：合约电量 发电市场 市场规模 SWARM仿真 

分 类 号：F812.0[经济管理—财政学]