现代风险导向审计下审计三方关系人的博弈分析  

Game Analysis of Audit Relationships:under Risk-Oriented Mode

作　　者：庄立[1] 王玉蓉[1] 

机构地区：[1]华南农业大学经济管理学院,广东广州510642

出　　处：《审计与经济研究》2007年第6期26-30,共5页Journal of Audit & Economics

摘　　要：本文将现代风险审计理念引入完全信息动态博弈模型中,构建和比较了传统审计模式和现代风险导向审计模式下CPA、客户以及政府监管三方关系人博弈模型,提出要切实减少违规行为,不仅要加重违规处罚,还要加大对政府监管失职的惩处,更重要的是在CPA行业全面推广应用风险导向审计模式。Under the risk audit of modem concepts to introduce complete information model Dynamic Game, this paper constructs and compares the traditional audit model and risk-oriented model about CPA audit, customers and government regulation Game tripartite relationship. Positive conclusions have been drawn to test the basic assumptions. It is concluded that in reducing malpractice and irregularities should not only increase punishment, but also increase the government＇s monitoring of dereliction of duty to punish, more importantly, it is the CPA application comprehensive audit risk-oriented mode.

关 键 词：风险导向审计 政府监管 合谋 博弈分析 

分 类 号：F239.43[经济管理—会计学]