农村社区公共物品的农户自愿供给——基于声誉理论的分析  

Farmers' Voluntary Provision of Public Goods in Rural Communities——Analysis Based on the Theory of Reputation

作　　者：符加林[1] 崔浩[2] 黄晓红[1] 

机构地区：[1]浙江大学管理学院,浙江杭州210027 [2]浙江大学法学院,浙江杭州310028

出　　处：《经济经纬》2007年第4期106-109,共4页Economic Survey

基　　金：2006年浙江省社科规划重大招标课题(06ZDB05ZD)

摘　　要：农户的声誉不仅能给农户带来直接效用,它还具备信息效应与资本效应,对农户参与农村社区公共物品供给博弈的均衡路径产生重要影响。在独立博弈下,声誉的直接效用能使农户采取合作行动;在关联博弈和重复博弈中,声誉的信息及资本效应对农户的偷懒行为有很强的约束,将导致博弈进入合作均衡。因此基于声誉损益的考虑,由农户自愿供给农村社区内的公共物品会是一个有效的结果。Farmers＇ reputation may produce not only direct utility, but also information effect and capital effect,and this will significantly affect the equilibrium path for farmers to take part in the game of providing public goods in rural community. The direct utility from repu- tation can make the farmers cooperate in the sole game. At the same time, the reputation information and capital effect have strong restriction to farmers＇ non - cooperation in the associated and repeated games, and this helps to obtain a cooperation equilibrium, So taking reputation into account, farmers voluntarily provision of public goods in rural communities will be an effective result.

关 键 词：声誉 农户 农村社区 公共物品 均衡 

分 类 号：F320[经济管理—产业经济]