正交易费用下的“囚犯难题”  

"Prisoners' Dilemma"in Positive Transaction Cost

作　　者：谢作诗[1] 

机构地区：[1]沈阳师范大学国际商学院,辽宁沈阳110034

出　　处：《经济经纬》2007年第5期1-3,共3页Economic Survey

摘　　要："囚犯难题"正确的启示不应该是个人理性与集体理性有冲突、个人理性选择的结果可能无效率,而应该是:第一,有效的制度安排一定要构成纳什均衡。第二,制度很重要,有什么样的制度安排,就会有什么样的行为结果。与其说"囚犯难题"部分地奠定了非合作博弈论的理论基础,不如说它更多地揭示了制度经济学的精髓。传统分析犯了拿这个约束条件下的事去做那个约束条件下的标准或者参照的错误,完全忽视了正交易费用的约束。The correct revelation of ＂ prisoners＇dilema＂ should not be that there are conflicts between individual sense and collective sense or the individual relult of choice might be ineffective, but that firstly effective institutional arrangement must constitute Nash equilibrium and secondly institutional arrangement is very important and different institutional arrangement will lead to different institutional results. ＂Prisoners＂ dilema＂ opens up the kernel of institutional economics more than partly lays the foundation of noncooperation game theory. Traditional analysis makes the mistake of making the standard or reference under one condition with the things under the other condition and totally neglects the restriction of positive transaction cost.

关 键 词：理性 效率 约束条件下的最大化 

分 类 号：F0[经济管理—政治经济学]