地方政府竞争的博弈分析——以引进外资为例  

A Game Analysis of the Competition among Local Governments

作　　者：王然[1] 

机构地区：[1]河南财经学院经济系学,河南郑州450011

出　　处：《经济经纬》2007年第5期4-6,共3页Economic Survey

摘　　要：为了提高政绩,地方政府纷纷以优惠政策来吸引外资,并为此展开了"优惠政策大战"。不同行政区划、不同级别的地方政府间的这种竞争是有差别的,其中同一行政区划内同一级别地方政府间的竞争是最主要的。为外资提供优惠政策是地方政府官员的占优战略,但却是社会的劣战略。原因在于该行动存在负外部性。只有消除这种负外部性,才能避免"优惠政策大战"。To improve the achievements in official career, local governments have to provide the preferential policies to attract foreign investment. The competition between defferent administrative regions and different levels of local governments is different and the competition in the same administrative region and the same level of local government is the most important. This kind of action is the dominant strategy for local government officials, but it is not the dominant strategy for the society. The reason lies in that this kind of action has negative externality. Oaly by eliminating the negative externalities can ＂the war of preferential policies＂ be avoided.

关 键 词：地方政府竞争 完全信息静态博弈 囚徒困境 负外部性 

分 类 号：F061.3[经济管理—政治经济学]