企业融资主体融资行为的博弈分析  

A Game Analysis of the Financing Behavior of Enterprise Financing Body

作　　者：杨振宇[1] 穆争社[2] 

机构地区：[1]西安交通大学经济与金融学院,陕西西安710061 [2]中国人民银行货币政策司,北京100800

出　　处：《经济经纬》2007年第5期133-136,共4页Economic Survey

摘　　要：投资者和融资企业之间的不完美且不完全信息动态博弈,其结果为精炼贝叶斯纳什均衡,这损害了投资者和融资企业的利益。解决的办法是使博弈转化为完美且完全信息动态博弈。具体措施,一是提高投资者对融资企业类型的甄别能力;二是加大绩差企业伪装成绩优企业的成本。The result of the imperfect and incomplete information dynamic game between investors and financing enterprises is perfect Bayesian Nash equilibrium, which damages the benefits of investors and financing enterprises. The solution is making the game turn into perfect and complete information dynamic game. The concrete measures are to raise the investors＇ ability to discriminate the types of financing enterprises on one hand and to enhance the cost of poor - performance enterprises pretending to be good - performance enterprises.

关 键 词：投资者 融资企业 博弈 精炼贝叶斯纳什均衡 

分 类 号：F832.42[经济管理—金融学]