自然主义的意向性难题与信息语义学  

Intentionality Problem of Naturalism and Information Semantics

作　　者：高新民[1] 严景阳[1] 

机构地区：[1]华中师范大学心灵与认知研究中心,武汉430079

出　　处：《自然辩证法研究》2007年第12期32-36,共5页Studies in Dialectics of Nature

基　　金：国家社会科学基金2004年度项目"意向性理论的当代发展"(04BZX042)

摘　　要：自然主义或广义的物理主义是现当代西方心灵哲学中占主导地位的思潮。它能较令人满意地将大多数心理现象自然化,但意向性却负隅抵制,被公认为自然化的一大难题。哲学是解难题的活动,因此意向性自然成了当今心灵哲学中的热点和焦点问题之一。德雷斯基的信息语义学不仅根据自己所倡导的自然主义方案对意向性作了独到的阐发,而且对信息和因果性等问题发表了发人深省的看法。Naturalism or generalized physicalism is the underlying trend of thought in the modern and contemporary Western philosophy of mind. It can satisfactorily naturalize the majority of the phenomena of mind, but intentionality puts up a stiff resistance and is universally rgarded as a problem in naturalization. Philosophy is an activity of solving problems, and intentionality has thus naturally become a hot issue and focus in the philosophy of mind nowadays. Dretske＇s information semantics has not only made original explanation about intentionality following his naturalism principles but also put forward thought-provoking views on the relation between information and causality.

关 键 词：意向性 自然化 信息 语义学 

分 类 号：N031[自然科学总论—科学技术哲学]