制度与增长：理论解释及中国的经验  

Institutions and Growth:Theoretical Explanation and China's Experience

作　　者：单豪杰[1] 沈坤荣[1] 

机构地区：[1]南京大学经济学院

出　　处：《南开经济研究》2007年第5期3-18,共16页Nankai Economic Studies

基　　金：南京大学研究生科研创新基金项目(项目号:2006CW01);国家社科基金(项目号:03BJL026)的赞助

摘　　要：本文首先对制度的内涵进行了经济学的诠释,重点介绍了新制度经济学中以North为代表的外生模式和以Schotter、Aoki和Greif为代表的内生博弈模式,同时也对马克思经济学中的制度观进行了简要阐述;接着在以上的基础上对制度与增长关系的理论文献和经验研究进行了综述,并对基于中国经验的几个代表性理论进行了回顾,继而为后续理论的提出提供思想启迪;最后,文章在基于已有的理论文献和中国经济转型期事实特征的基础上运用制度经济学外生模式的原理,提出了一个解读"中国经济增长之谜"的制度经济学的新分析框架,并为解决制度与增长关系问题提供了一个基于中国转型期的证据。This paper fwstly gives a economic explanation about institutions＇ connotation and introduces two patterns which take North as representative＇s exogenous pattern and take Schotter. Aoki and Greif as representative＇s endogenous game pattern in new institutions economics, simultaneously also gives the brief introduction to the Marx economics＇ institutions view. Then this paper gives a literature review on relations of institutions and growth in the previous analytic foundation, subsequently surveys several representative theories according to China＇s experience in order to provide the thought inspiration for the following theory. Finally, this paper put forward a theoretical framework for explaining ＂the enigma of China＇s growth＂ according to exogenous pattern based on the existing theory literature and China＇s transitional characteristics, and provide a China＇s transitional evidence for solving the relations of institutions and growth.

关 键 词：制度 经济增长 文献综述 法治 

分 类 号：C913[经济管理]