排污权交易中的寡占企业博弈分析  

Game Analysis of Oligopolists under the Conditions of Tradable Emission Permits

作　　者：李创[1] 胡德朝[1] 

机构地区：[1]华北水利水电学院,河南郑州450011

出　　处：《华北水利水电学院学报》2007年第6期82-84,共3页North China Institute of Water Conservancy and Hydroelectric Power

摘　　要：在寡头垄断市场中,排污权交易的治理效率会由于垄断效应而降低.应用古诺模型建立寡头垄断条件下的排污权交易博弈模型,分析了排污权对寡头垄断市场的影响,得出了在无限次重复博弈中,对于不同的贴现率,厂商有不同的策略.该方法可为厂商实现较高效率均衡提供参考.Under the conditions of duopoly,the efficiency of pollution control will be researched because of monopoly. A game model of tradable emission permits under conditions of duopoly is established based on the Cournot game model. How tradable emission permits influences oligopoly market is researched. It is concluded that according to different discount,ologopolists have different choices form infinitely repeated games. This method can be regarded as a reference for ologopolists how the higher efficient equilibrium conditions can be realized.

关 键 词：排污权交易 寡头垄断 古诺模型 重复博弈 

分 类 号：F224.32[经济管理—国民经济]