我国上市公司监督成本对审计意见的选择行为实证研究  

An Empirical Research on the Cost of Supervision and the Behavior of Selecting Audit Opinion of China's Listed Companies

作　　者：曹建新[1] 

机构地区：[1]华南理工大学工商管理学院,广东广州510640

出　　处：《系统工程》2007年第10期88-93,共6页Systems Engineering

基　　金：国家自然科学基金资肋项目(70472041)

摘　　要：建立委托人、代理人与外部审计人的博弈模型,研究我国上市公司监督成本与审计意见选择行为的相互关系,并用实证研究方法对概念模型和研究假设进行了检验。本文研究结果表明提高监督成本会使代理人选择购买审计意见行为的概率减少。这为研究委托代理关系中的我国上市公司代理成本与审计意见选择行为之间的关系提供了科学理论依据和决策参考。This paper establishes the game model of client, the agent and the external audit, the research is about China＇s listed companies＇ agency costs and audit opinions choice of mutual relations. The research uses empirical research methods to test the conceptual model and the hypothesis. The results show that the cost would increase supervision of agents and it will reduce the probability of the option of buying the audit opinion. It supplies the theoretical basis and the decision reference for the study of the relationship between China＇s listed companies＇ agency costs and audit opinions choice.

关 键 词：委托代理关系 上市公司 监督成本 审计意见 选择行为 

分 类 号：F239[经济管理—会计学]