具有负的双边网络外部性的媒体市场竞争研究  

Study on media competition based on two-sided market theory

作　　者：朱振中[1] 吕廷杰[2] 

机构地区：[1]山东理工大学管理学院,淄博255049 [2]北京邮电大学经济管理学院,北京100876

出　　处：《管理科学学报》2007年第6期13-23,共11页Journal of Management Sciences in China

基　　金：国家自然科学基金资助项目(70472073);山东软科学计划资助项目(B200642)

摘　　要：构建了具有负外部性的双边市场模型,以考察由消费者和广告资助的媒体企业之间的双寡头垄断竞争.研究表明,媒体企业的替代性越强,则对消费者收取的价格越低,到媒体访问的消费者越多,广告水平和广告价格也越高,然而这种行为却减少了媒体的利润.媒体竞争的增加导致媒体企业的收入来源从消费者向广告商的转移,而主要由广告资助的媒体企业拥有较多的消费者.应用该模型分析了媒体与广告商组建垂直联盟的激励问题,结果表明,当媒体差异化程度较大时,媒体都组建垂直联盟是最佳选择.然而,如果媒体是密切的替代品,都保持独立达到纳什均衡.This paper develops a model of two-sided market with negative externality, to study the duopoly competition between two media firms that are both advertising-financed and consumer-financed, which provides us with an insight of describing functional mechanism, effect of differentiated strategies and equilibrium market structure. It is shown that the lower the equilibrium prices of consumers are, the larger the amounts of consumers, visiting media , and higher the prices and the larger the amounts of advertising , the less differentiated the media are perceived to be, even though these behaviors reduce their profit. In addition, an increase in media competition results in a shift from consumer payments to advertising as a source of media＇ s revenue, and media firms that are mainly advertising financed have relatively more consumers. Applying this model to analyze the incentives of media firms to form vertical alliance with their advertiser, we find that media firms forming alliance is an optimal choice when they are more differentiated. However, when they are closer substitutes, keeping independent is a Nash equilibrium outcome.

关 键 词：双边市场 媒体竞争 负外部性 垂直联盟 

分 类 号：F062.5[经济管理—政治经济学]