金融组织违规披露信息数量分析  

Study on the Information Disclosure Behavior of the Financial Organization Violating the Rules

作　　者：杨振宇[1] 穆争社[2] 

机构地区：[1]西安交通大学经济与金融学院,陕西西安710061 [2]中国人民银行金融研究所,北京100800

出　　处：《山西财经大学学报》2007年第12期100-106,共7页Journal of Shanxi University of Finance and Economics

摘　　要：当金融组织按照利润最大化原则确定的信息披露数量小于政府按照市场效率最大化原则确定的信息披露数量时,金融组织就产生了违规披露信息的动机,违规披露信息数量是两者的差额,是其违规披露信息的可能最大数量。但政府不会容许其存在,会通过提高执法严厉程度减少它,减少的最优数量决定于强制金融组织减少违规披露信息导致的社会边际成本等于社会边际收益。这表明,剩余的违规信息披露数量是政府所容许的,是金融组织的最优违规信息披露数量。When that the financial organization disclose information quantity according to the maximize profits principle is smaller than the government compulsive information disclosure quantity according to the maximize market efficiency principle, the financial organization produced the motive of the disclosure information violating the rules, its quantity is both of difference in amount, is the disclosure information of may biggest quantity violating the rides. But the government can＇ t allow its existence, the decreasing of superior quantity is decided by the social marginal cost and the social marginal revenue that force the financial organization reduce the disclosure information quantity violating. This expresses that the surplus quantity that violating the rules is allowed by the government, is the superior quantity that violating the rules of the financial organization.

关 键 词：非对称信息 强制性信息披露 违规披露信息的可能最大数量 违规披露信息的最优减少量 最优违规信息披露数量 

分 类 号：F830[经济管理—金融学]