模糊因子下知识产权保护与侵犯的动态博弈分析  

Analysis of Dynamic Game of the Intellectual Property Protection and Infringement with Fuzzy Factors

作　　者：袁中许[1] 

机构地区：[1]许昌职业技术学院信息工程系,河南许昌461000

出　　处：《数学的实践与认识》2008年第1期27-32,共6页Mathematics in Practice and Theory

摘　　要：针对知识产权屡禁不止的侵权行为现状,运用模糊数学、数理统计方法和博弈论原理,从知识产权保护和侵犯双方效用及模型出发,以系统和动态的视角对双方行为进了博弈分析.研究结果表明保护与侵犯构成为一对均衡策略状态,其主要原因在于一定条件下,保护方期望的效用均衡处于低水平态势,从而提出在效用模糊因子的调整中不断提高保护方的动态效用水平是推进有效保护知识产权的动力途径.In allusion to the present situation of usually suffered infringement of intellectual, beginning from the both utility models of intellectual protection and infringement, this paper analyzes their game in the view of dynamic behavior by vague mathematics, mathematical statistics methods and game theory. The result of research shows that the common survivor of infringement and protection will be an equilibrium state by strategy, which is mainly owing to the low equilibrium of the utility of the protection under actual conditions. Consequently it is put forward that the ultimate measure of protecting intellectual property lies in continually increasing the dynamic utility level of the protection with adjustion of the fuzzy factors.

关 键 词：知识产权 动态博弈 效用模型 模糊因子 

分 类 号：F204[经济管理—国民经济] F224.32