分级财政体制下纵向税收外部性研究  

Vertical Tax Externality in the Multi-level Fiscal System

作　　者：马恩涛[1] 

机构地区：[1]山东经济学院财政金融学院,山东济南250014

出　　处：《财经论丛》2008年第1期30-36,共7页Collected Essays on Finance and Economics

摘　　要：相对于横向税收外部性强调同一层级政府间税收调整所造成的相互影响,纵向税收外部性强调不同层级政府间税收调整由于税基交迭所导致的交互作用。传统理论认为中央和地方政府间纵向税收外部性呈反向关系,实际上它也可能成正向关系,这取决于政府征收的是从量税还是从价税以及税收缴纳主体处于竞争市场的哪一边即是劳动力或商品的供给方还是需求方。如果中央与地方政府都对劳动力供给从量征收工薪所得税或者都对生产者从价征收消费税,都有可能导致政府间纵向税收外部性成正向关系。Compared with the horizontal tax externality which emphasizes the interaction of the same level government＇s tax adjustment, vertical tax externality pays more attention to the different thing. Contrary to the traditional conclusion that the vertical tax externality between central and local governments is of negative relation, we think that relation may be positive. The sign of the vertical tax externality depends on whether the central government imposes per unit or adds valorem tax rate, the side of the market, and the elasticity of demand. Owning to the different directions of the vertical externality, we must take into all the aspects account and avoid caring one thing and missing another when we remedy externality.

关 键 词：分税制 税基交迭 纵向外部性 匹配性支出 

分 类 号：F810[经济管理—财政学]