论宪法审查机制间的交错兼容  

Interlacement Between Operational Mechanisms of Constitutional Review

作　　者：陈丹[1] 

机构地区：[1]浙江大学光华法学院,浙江杭州310008

出　　处：《中国矿业大学学报（社会科学版）》2007年第4期53-58,共6页Journal of China University of Mining & Technology(Social Sciences)

基　　金：国家社科基金规划项目(项目编号:05BFX012)

摘　　要：普通法院、宪法委员会、宪法法院三大机构模式可归结到具体审查与抽象审查两大审查机制分析框架之中,其在组织结构、审查程序、审查对象、判决效力上构造的不同实乃具体审查与抽象审查两大审查机制作用之分野,然而随着美国与欧洲传统上的权力分立原则陷入危机,三大模式已不能就其审查者究竟是在行使司法权还是在履行政治功能自圆其说,因此由宪法审查的司法性或政治性所带来的具体审查与抽象审查两大机制间的差异也渐渐淡去,在整体上呈现出一幅交错兼容的景象。The three constitutional review models of common court, constitutional council and constitutional court can be classified into two operational mechanisms： concrete review and abstract review, which result in differences of organization structures, review proceedings, review object and verdict force among the above three models. However, with the principle of power separation falling into crisis in the U.S. and Europe, it is almost impossible to explain whether the judges actually exercise judicial powers or perform political function, the boundaries between concrete review and abstract review are interlaced with each other.

关 键 词：具体审查 抽象审查 普通法院模式 宪法委员会模式 宪法法院模式 

分 类 号：D911.01[政治法律—宪法学与行政法学]