Nash谈判解的预测能力——中国被试的实验证据  

Forecast Ability of Nash Bargaining Solution ——Evidence from China

作　　者：李建标[1] 李晓义[1] 孙娟[1] 祁艳玲[1] 

机构地区：[1]南开大学商学院,300071

出　　处：《南开经济研究》2007年第6期33-42,共10页Nankai Economic Studies

基　　金：国家自然科学基金项目(70672029);教育部人文社会科学重点研究基地项目(05JJD630023);国家自然科学基金重点项目(70532001);天津市社科项目(TJ05-GL004);南开大学"985工程"哲学社会科学创新基地--"中国企业管理与制度创新"研究项目;南开大学本科学生创新科研项目

摘　　要：讨价还价是人们最基本的交易制度之一。在非结构化的讨价还价中,Nash谈判解具有重要的预测意义,但现有的实验研究表明,Nash谈判解的第4公理,即效用线性变换无关性公理,并没有很好地得到实验结果支持。本文的实验表明,信息问题并没有影响Nash谈判解的预测能力,即在完全信息条件下,第4公理仍然是不可拒绝的。但在信息完全框架中加上谈判者不同的效用评价,Nash谈判解的预测能力被折扣掉一部分,这也说明不能笼统地将信息和效用评价放在一起来界定第4公理。Bargaining is thought to be one of the basic trading institutions.In unstructured bargaining, Nash Bargaining Solution is of important forecast meaning.However, in previous experimental studies, the forth axiom of Nash Bargaining Solution invariance to linear transformations of utility could not be supported by the results. In present study, the experimental results showed that information failed to influence the forecasting ability. Specifically, even in the condition of complete information, the forth axiom still could not be denied.However, if we involved different Utility Evaluation of bargainers into the frame of complete information, the forecasting ability of Nash Bargaining Solution would wane, which indicated that the two factors of information and utility evaluation could not be put together to define the forth axiom.

关 键 词：双边讨价还价 Nash谈判解实验 

分 类 号：F224[经济管理—国民经济]