不完全合作、非合作博弈的逻辑：企业与行业协会价格串谋行为分析  

The Logic of Incomplete Cooperative and Non-Cooperative Game:Analysis of Price Conspiracy between Enterprises and Industry Association

作　　者：何继新[1] 刘莹 

机构地区：[1]北华大学经济管理学院,吉林吉林132013 [2]吉林市政府信息中心,吉林吉林132013

出　　处：《经济经纬》2008年第1期73-75,共3页Economic Survey

摘　　要：串谋企业涉及的利益主体主要是企业、行业协会与监管者,频频发生的行业协会参与企业价格串谋实际上是不同利益主体之间博弈的结果。他们之间的博弈是不完全合作、非合作博弈。笔者建立了串谋企业及其行业协会、监管者之间的博弈分析模型,认为影响企业及其行业协会价格串谋概率高低的主要因素是制度安排、串谋成本与监管力度等。Conspiracy with enterprises involves the benefits of enterprises, industry association and the supervisor. In fact the frequent involvement of industry association and enterprises in price conspiracy is the result of games between different main bodies of benefit. The game among them is incomplete cooperative and non - cooperative game. The authors establish a game analysis model among enterprises, associations and supervisors, and holds that the main factors that influence the probability of price conspiracy between enterprises and associations are system arrangement, conspiracy cost and supervision degree etc.

关 键 词：企业 价格串谋 不完全合作博弈 不完全非合作博弈 

分 类 号：F224.0[经济管理—国民经济]