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机构地区:[1]西南交通大学经济管理学院,四川成都610031
出 处:《经济经纬》2008年第1期157-160,共4页Economic Survey
基 金:教育部高等院校博士点专项科研基金(20060613019)
摘 要:现有文献对专利法中具体权利限制制度的研究,难以使我们从整体上把握专利法利益平衡原则的作用机制。而从社会契约论的视角着眼,专利法利益平衡机制可归结为信息公开-权利专有的对价关系。运用法经济学原理进行的分析表明,契约对价通过专利长度和专利宽度两个法律变量的变化协调双方的利益关系。分析结果进一步指出专利契约在实践中面临价值缺失的危险,提出在契约订立过程中引入博弈机制是重构专利契约的关键。The research in existent literature on the concrete right restriction system in patent law makes it difficult for us to grasp the operation mechanism for the principle of interest balance in patent law. From the perspective of the theory of social contract, the mechanism of interest balance in patent law may be reduced to the consideration of information publicity - right exclusiveness. The analysis with law and economics principle shows contract consideration can coordinate two sides' interests through the two legal variables of patent length and breadth. The result of the analysis further points out that patent contract faces the danger of value deficiency in practice and suggests that the introduction of game mechanism in the process of contract - making is the key to the reconstruction of patent contract.
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