戈德曼的可靠论成功维护了自然化认识论吗？  

Does Goldman’s Reliabilism Successfully Justified the Naturalized Epistemology?

作　　者：陈高华[1] 李淑英[2] 

机构地区：[1]天津师范大学马克思主义学院,天津300387 [2]中南财经政法大学哲学系,武汉430073

出　　处：《自然辩证法研究》2008年第1期35-39,共5页Studies in Dialectics of Nature

基　　金：教育部人文社会科学重点基地重大项目“认知科学前沿的哲学问题研究”的支持(项目编号:06JJD720011)

摘　　要：认识论的自然化是近年来认识论发展的主要进路之一,但是,自奎因明确提出以来,自然化认识论就伴随着批判。戈德曼提出其可靠论,力图解决自然化认识论所面临的自主性和规范性问题,进而维护一种比较温和的自然化认识论。本文通过分析戈德曼的可靠论及其相应的批判和辩护,从而表明,一方面戈德曼的过程可靠论作为知识确证理论是不成功的;另一方面,即使他的可靠论是成功的知识确证理论,也不能成为自然化认识论的合理辩护。To naturalizing the epistemology, it is one of the main approaches to development of epistemology recently. But, since naturalized epistemology put forward by Quine, it accompanies the critique. Goldman advanced the reliablism in order to resolve the autonomy and normativity faced the naturalized epistemology, and justified a mild naturalized epistemology. Through the critique and justification of Goldman＇ s relabilism, the author points out that, on the one hand, as a theory of knowledge＇ justification, Goldman＇s process relabilism is unsuccessful, on the other hand, given that it is successful, his relabilism could not be a plausible justification to naturalized epistemology.

关 键 词：可靠论 自然化认识论 自然 理性 

分 类 号：N031[自然科学总论—科学技术哲学]