不对称信息下易腐物品供应链最优数量折扣合同研究  

Optimal Quantity Discount Policy for Perishable Supply Chain under Asymmetric Information

作　　者：张钦红[1] 骆建文[1] 

机构地区：[1]上海交通大学安泰经济与管理学院,上海200052

出　　处：《系统工程理论与实践》2007年第12期23-28,35,共7页Systems Engineering-Theory & Practice

基　　金：国家自然科学基金(70572101);教育部新世纪优秀人才支持计划基金(04-0395);上海市曙光学者计划基金(05SG18)

摘　　要：以持续变质的易腐物品为研究对象,分析协调易腐品两级供应链的最优数量折扣合同机制.给出了关于零售商的库存持有成本信息对称及不对称时供应商的最优数量折扣合同,结论表明:信息对称时数量折扣合同可以协调供应链,而信息不对称时单一的数量折扣合同不能取得供应链整体的最优;此外,非易腐物品供应链的数量折扣合同仅为易腐品的特例.最后通过算例验证了文章的结论.Quantity discount contracts for supply chain of perishable product composed of one supplier and one retailer is studied in this paper. The optimal quantity contracts under both symmetric and asymmetric information of the retailer＇s holding cost are given. Conclusions demonstrate that quantity discount contract can coordinate supply chain under symmetric information but it is not the case when there is information asymmetry. In addition, contract of non- perishable product is just the special case of that of the perishable product. A numerical study is given to demonstrate the conclusions of the paper.

关 键 词：供应链管理 易腐品 数量折扣 信息不对称 

分 类 号：F253[经济管理—国民经济]