公共政策与创业企业中的契约安排  

Public Policy and the Allocation of Contract in VC-backed Firms

作　　者：刘瑞翔[1] 陈森发[1] 

机构地区：[1]东南大学经济管理学院

出　　处：《系统管理学报》2007年第6期596-601,共6页Journal of Systems & Management

基　　金：江苏省科协软科学研究计划资助项目(R106);江苏省软科学研究计划资助项目(BR2006039)

摘　　要：研究了公共政策与创业企业效率间的关系。由于创业者受到财富限制,许多具有投资价值的企业往往无法取得所需的外部资本,或创业者取得的股权少于合理的比例;同时,由于创业企业中存在双边道德风险,投资者和创业者投入的努力水平无法达到最优。研究发现,政府可以制定合理的公共政策提高创业企业的效率,如通过事后财政补贴的方式,使得更多具有投资价值的企业获得创业资本,提高双方的努力水平;或通过对创业者和投资者设置不同的税率,改变创业企业股权配置的范围,有利于创业者取得更多的股权比例,从而提高创业企业的成功概率。This paper investigates the relationship between public policy and the efficiency of VC-backed firms. Many profitable enterprise can not get the outside capital or the entrepreneur often get too little equity because of her wealth constrains, while the effort level of the entrepreneur and venture capitalist can not be the first best because of the bilateral moral hazard in enterprise. This paper found that the efficiency of the enterprise can be enhanced by public policy, for example,more profitable enterprise will get the outside capital and the effort level of the both sides will be enhanced because of the ex post subsidies, or the entrepreneur can get more equity which is helpful to raise the success probability of the start-ups by setting different taxes betwwen the entrepreneur and venture capitalist.

关 键 词：公共政策 创业投资 双边道德风险 契约 

分 类 号：F830[经济管理—金融学]