基于股东中心主义的国有公司治理模型分析  

A SOE Governance Model Based on the Theory of Shareholder Governance

作　　者：安增军[1] 郑国泽[2] 

机构地区：[1]福建行政学院,福建福州350002 [2]福州大学管理学院,福建福州350002

出　　处：《经济管理》2008年第2期22-26,共5页Business and Management Journal ( BMJ )

摘　　要：本文采用共同代理模型,结合我国国有公司独特的治理背景,在股东中心主义的理论基础上,运用分布参数模型法求解最优的国有公司经理努力水平。讨论了国有股东效用组成、股权结构和激励机制等因素对最优的经理努力水平的影响。研究发现,国有公司股权需要一定的集中度,但并不应该人为规定股权比例,激励与努力不存在单调关系,激励机制的效果取决于多种激励手段的综合运用。In this paper ,we set up a common agency model, which is based on the theory of shareholder governance consider with the background of Chinese state-owned corporate, and use the parameterized distribution formulation to find out the manager＇ s maximal effort .Then ,we discuss the influence of the following ingredients for the equilibrium solution, such as the state-owned shareholder＇ s component of utility, the structure of share and the incentive institution .We find that the share structure of SOE need some concentration and its not necessary to set a equality ratio ,meanwhile the discussion show that incentive is not monotonous with the manager＇ s effort.

关 键 词：股东中心 共同代理 经理努力 

分 类 号：F019[经济管理—政治经济学]