股市中信息披露与监管的博弈分析  

Game Analysis on Stock Market Information Disclosure and Its Supervision

作　　者：王雪平[1] 

机构地区：[1]安阳师范学院,河南安阳455000

出　　处：《金融理论与实践》2008年第1期97-100,共4页Financial Theory and Practice

摘　　要：我国股市属于无效市场,存在投机过度的现象。究其原因,在于股市存在虚假信息披露现象。本文通过建立造假与监管的博弈模型,得到了上市公司与证券监管部门的三个纳什均衡,并进一步分析了监管的有效性,找到了根治信息造假行为的切实可行的办法。随后根据以上分析,提出了建立有效股市的若干个建议。China＇s stock market is ineffective and excessive speculation exists in this market. The cause lies in false information disclosure in stock market. Through setting up the game model of false information and supervision, three Nash equilibriums have been found between listed companies and securities regulators. Furthermore, the paper analyses the effectiveness of supervision, and finds practical methods to eliminate the behavior which makes false information. Finally, it provides some suggestions for effective stock market building.

关 键 词：投机过度 信息披露 混合战略纳什均衡 有效性 

分 类 号：F832.5[经济管理—金融学]