农户声誉对农村借贷市场中逆向选择的约束研究  

The Control Study on Adverse Selection in Rural Credit Market Based on Farmer Household's Reputation

作　　者：黄晓红[1] 

机构地区：[1]浙江大学管理学院,浙江杭州310027

出　　处：《华东经济管理》2008年第1期66-69,共4页East China Economic Management

摘　　要：农户的声誉是信用社借贷决策中主要的考量因素之一。声誉能够反映农户能力与品格的综合信息,那些能力较强、品格好的农户才会有较高的声誉水平。文章利用信号传递博弈模型,阐明在农户与信用社的非对称信息借贷博弈中,农户声誉如何成为信用社识别可信赖的贷款农户的有效信号,从而克服农村借贷中的逆向选择问题。Farmer household＇s reputation is one of the main effect factor in rural credit cooperative （RCC） . Reputation can reveal the integrating information about the farmer household＇s ability and moral, and only those farmers who are capable and have good moral can hold good reputation. The article use a signaling model to clarify how the RCCs identify the trustworthy farmer households by their reputation in the credit game between farmers and RCCs under the condition of asymmetric information, and so , the adverse selection Can he controlled in the rural credit market.

关 键 词：声誉 农户 信用社 逆向选择 

分 类 号：F323[经济管理—产业经济]