代理人市场—声誉模型在内部经理人市场中的拓展应用  

An Expended Application of Reputation Effects Model in Interior Handlers Market

作　　者：闫景园[1] 黄安仲[1] 

机构地区：[1]安徽工业大学经济学院,安徽马鞍山243002

出　　处：《华东经济管理》2008年第1期150-152,共3页East China Economic Management

摘　　要：我国外部经理人市场尚不完善,外部经理人市场上的声誉作为经理人显性激励契约的替代作用有限。文章在假设不存在外部经理人市场的前提下,研究了内部经理人市场对经理人产生激励的方式和影响因素,认为内部经理人市场的考核晋升机制和不同职位的隐性收益对经理人的行为有重要影响,提出了优化企业考核晋升机制、降低隐性职位收益、进一步完善外部经理人市场的建议。Outer handlers market has been playing a limited role as a substitute for dominant owner incentive contracts for it is still imperfect. Under the assumption that outer handlers market does not exit, this paper researches the effecting factors and ways provided by interior handlers market, and proves that assessment criteria, opportunity for advancement and recessive profits furnished by different position have a great influence on a handler. At last this paper gives some advices including optimizing assessment criteria, bringing down recessive profits and building an effective outer handlers market

关 键 词：声誉模型 内部经理人市场 激励 

分 类 号：F406.15[经济管理—产业经济]