基于博弈论的逆向供应链EPR实施模式研究  

Study on the EPR Application Pattern for the Reverse Supply Chain Based on the Game Theory

作　　者：吴刚[1] 陈兰芳[1] 游宗君[1] 王煜洲[2] 

机构地区：[1]西南交通大学峨眉校区,四川峨眉614202 [2]西南交通大学交通运输学院,四川成都610031

出　　处：《铁道运输与经济》2008年第2期65-68,共4页Railway Transport and Economy

基　　金：四川省哲学社会科学“十一五”规划项目(SC06C008)

摘　　要：EPR实施模式是EPR运作机制和整个逆向供应链的基础。基于博弈论研究认为,废旧产品规范回收面临着公共资源悲剧。理论上分析,虽通过引入惩罚机制可以弱化这一悲剧,但监督博弈分析证实,该机制在实践中并不可行。同时,公共资源悲剧理论也表明国外EPR的3种实施模式在国内难以应用。最后结合国情,提出在逆向供应链中采用环保型和环境保护、资源节约兼顾型的分阶段EPR实施模式。The application pattern of Extended Producer Responsibility （EPR） serves as the basis for the EPR operation mechanism and the overall reverse supply chain. Based on the research of game theory, the regulatory recycling of waste products is confronted with the tragedy of the common resources. Theoretically, the penalty rules to be implemented can weaken this tragedy, furthermore, the analysis based on the supervision game reveals that the penalty rules are unrealistic in practice. As the theory of tragedy of the common resources proves, it is impractical to apply any of the three foreign ERP patterns to our country as well. The paper finally works the real conditions in China into the conclusion that the grading EPR application pattern of environmental protection model and the model combining environmental protection and economical resources should be applied in reverse supply chain.

关 键 词：逆向供应链 监督博弈 生产商延伸责任 

分 类 号：O225[理学—运筹学与控制论] F259.22[理学—数学]