基于信号传递博弈模型的担保公司风险控制  

Risk Control Analysis of the Specialized Guarantee Company Based on Signaling Game Model

作　　者：冷静[1] 秦旋[1] 张云波[1] 

机构地区：[1]华侨大学土木工程学院,福建泉州362021

出　　处：《武汉理工大学学报（信息与管理工程版）》2008年第1期114-117,共4页Journal of Wuhan University of Technology：Information & Management Engineering

基　　金：福建省教育厅高校人才启动基金资助项目(07DS404)

摘　　要：以博弈论为理论基础,以专业担保公司和承包商为研究对象,运用信号传递博弈模型,分析了专业担保公司和承包商在追求各自利益最大化的前提下达到双方利益均衡的博弈过程;进而提出了一系列控制及规避风险的措施,包括建立严格的资质审查制度,制定合理的担保费用收取标准,以及要求提供抵押品、反担保等,从而为专业担保公司的风险控制提供了思路和参考。Based on the game theory, by using the signaling game model and choosing the specialized guarantee company and contractor for study, the game process during which the equilibrium of maximized benefit between the specialized guarantee company and contractor was analyzed. A series of measures to risk control such as establishing the prequalification system, formulating rational standard of bond fee, setting counter -guarantee, etc, were also put forward to provide fresh thoughts and references for the specialized guarantee company.

关 键 词：工程担保 担保公司 承包商 信号传递博弈模型 风险控制 

分 类 号：F840[经济管理—保险]