负债对企业投资行为的影响--基于利益相关者冲突的视角  

The Influence of Debt Financing on the Company's Investment Decision——Based on the Perspective of Stockholders Conflict

作　　者：朱磊[1] 丁立波[2] 

机构地区：[1]山东大学管理学院,山东济南250100 [2]南京航空航天大学经济与管理学院,江苏南京210016

出　　处：《山西财经大学学报》2008年第2期120-124,共5页Journal of Shanxi University of Finance and Economics

摘　　要：企业的投资行为是否具有效率,直接关系到企业价值能否最大化,而负债融资对企业的非效率投资行为有着显著的影响:一方面,负债融资引发了股东—债权人冲突,使股东(经理)产生资产替代和投资不足行为;另一方面,负债减少了由企业利益相关者冲突所引起的过度投资行为。这里,负债对企业投资行为的影响是置于一个利益相关者冲突的框架内进行研究的。The efficiency of the company＇s investment is directly related to the maximization of the company＇s value. The influence of debt on the company＇s investment is very complicated. On one hand,debt financing can induce the shareholder＇s asset substitution and under - investment. On the other hand, the authors know there exists contradiction between various stakeholders which can induce over - investment. This paper uses a framework of stockholders＇ contradiction to study the influence of debt financing on investment.

关 键 词：利益相关者 负债 投资行为 

分 类 号：F23[经济管理—会计学]