清洁生产中企业与政府之间的博弈分析  

Game Analysis between Enterprise and Government on Clean Production

作　　者：陈舜友[1] 丁祖荣[1] 李娟[2] 

机构地区：[1]浙江理工大学经济管理学院,浙江杭州310018 [2]陕西省行政学院,陕西西安710068

出　　处：《环境科学与技术》2008年第1期142-144,共3页Environmental Science & Technology

基　　金：国家社科基金(07BJL032);浙江省社会科学规划项目(NX05SH05);浙江省教育厅2005年重点研究项目(20050753)

摘　　要：清洁生产作为对产品和产品生产过程的一种全新的、持续的、创造性的思想,变被动治理污染为积极预防污染,对环境改善具有重要的意义。本文从清洁生产和博弈论入手,分析了无政府监督情况下企业清洁生产和政府监督情况下的政府与企业间的混合战略纳什均衡,最后依据博弈结果指出推动清洁生产的相关建议。Clean production which is brand-new, sustained and creative to change the pattern of passive pollution treatment into. active pollution prevention and control in the course of industrial production is of great significance to the environmental improvement. Clean production and game theory was introduced, with analysis of Nash equilibrium between government and enterprise under government superintending condition as well as clean production without government superintending condition. Relevant suggestions for facilitating clean production were also recommended based on game results.

关 键 词：清洁生产 博弈论 纳什均衡 

分 类 号：X38[环境科学与工程—环境工程]