零售商关于售前服务的搭便车行为与RPM制度研究  

Retailers' Incentives to Free-ride on Presale Services and RPM Contract

作　　者：骆品亮[1] 陈连权[1] 

机构地区：[1]复旦大学管理学院,上海200433

出　　处：《产业经济研究》2008年第1期43-49,63,共8页Industrial Economics Research

基　　金：教育部新世纪优秀人才支持计划资助(项目编号:NCET-06-0361)

摘　　要：特殊服务理论学派(SST)认为,由于分销商可以获得品牌专用性信息,且其服务成本较低,因而制造商倾向于制订鼓励分销商提供额外服务的渠道激励政策。Telser等学者认为,转售价格维持协议(RPM)是制造商为防止零售商在售前服务上采取搭便车行为的一种制度安排。但是,Telser并未给出零售商搭便车行为与售前服务成本的关系。本文对售前服务、搭便车与RPM制度展开进一步研究,探讨了RPM制度下制造商和零售商关于售前服务成本的分摊问题,刻画了零售商搭便车行为与售前服务成本的关系,给出RPM制度激励零售商提供售前服务的条件。作为应用,本文分析了中国汽车业价格联盟事件的动因及其崩溃的缘由。According to Tslser＇s SST, RPM is an effective legal institution arrangement for manufacturer to prohibit retailer＇s free riding on presale services. Unfortunately, Telser didn＇t give more specific conditions for implementing RPM contract. By establishing a spatial competition model to deeply study the efficiency of RPM contract, we get the relationship between retailer＇s incentive to free-ride on presale services and retailer＇s proportion of services cost, and give the necessary conditions for RPM contract to effectively stimulate retailers to provide presale services. Furthermore, we study a case of price agreement in China mobile industry to support the main conclusions of our research.

关 键 词：售前服务 搭便车 转售价格维持协议 价格联盟 

分 类 号：O225[理学—运筹学与控制论]