交易成本、政府级次与财政体制改革  

Transaction Cost, Government Levels and the Reform of Fiscal Federalism

作　　者：李森[1] 

机构地区：[1]山东财政学院财税与公共管理学院,山东济南250014

出　　处：《当代财经》2008年第2期29-36,共8页Contemporary Finance and Economics

基　　金：山东财政学院科研基金资助项目(07YB011)

摘　　要：由于受交易成本的制约,管辖范围小、涉及人数少的"小政府"作为降低公共产品供给交易成本的制度安排首先得以形成。而后,为降低受益范围超出小政府辖区的公共产品供给的交易成本,更高层次的政府得以出现。政府级次化降低了公共产品供给的横向交易成本却增加了纵向交易成本,当横向交易成本的减少额与纵向交易成本的增加额在边际上相等时,政府级次达到均衡。由此看来,基层政府具有"逻辑先在性",采用"自上而下"分权的思路来构建财政体制是值得商榷的。财政体制的构建从逻辑上讲应该是"自下而上"授权而不是"自上而下"分权。Restrained by the transaction cost, and administering small areas of people, the small governments come into the role of an institution arrangement to decrease the transaction cost of public goods supply. However, to decrease the transaction cost of the supply of public goods which benefit areas beyond the small governments＇ jurisdiction, higher -level governments assume the leadership.. The stratification of governments may decrease the horizontal transaction cost of public goods supply, but can increase the vertical transaction cost. When the decreed amount of horizontal transaction cost equals the increased amount of vertical transaction cost marginally, the government levels trend to be in equilibrium. Since the grass-roots governments precede the larger governments, the idea of constructing fiscal federalism＂ from above to bottom＂ by the grass-roots government is questionable. It is argued that the order should be reversed in the construction of the fiscal federalism by the grass-roots governments.

关 键 词：政府级次 公共产品 交易成本 财政体制 

分 类 号：F812.2[经济管理—财政学]