商业银行信贷市场羊群行为范式及其效应  

The Effect and Model of the Herd Behavior for Commercial Bank on Credit Market

作　　者：邹新月[1] 邓淇中[1] 

机构地区：[1]湖南科技大学管理学院,湖南湘潭411201

出　　处：《湖南科技大学学报（社会科学版）》2008年第2期71-75,共5页Journal of Hunan University of Science and Technology(Social Science Edition)

基　　金：国家自然科学基金项目"基于行为金融理论的商业银行信贷范式及其市场效应研究"(70573032);国家社会科学基金项目"WTO条件下中国银行竞争能力安全问题与预警"(06BJL017);教育部2005年度新世纪优秀人才支持计划(NCET-05-0709)资助

摘　　要：建立了不完全信息下商业银行信贷投资决策模型,简要分析了如果一个信贷投资者对于自己的投资决策没有把握时,那么明智的做法是与其他信贷投资者保持一致,且其结果将导致商业银行信贷市场羊群行为不可避免的形成;并结合我国高校信贷实际情况,说明忽视私有信息的从众贷款行为,是单个银行信贷投资者短期内"有效"的最优决策,但从长远角度来看,无论对整个商业银行信贷市场还是对单个银行的信贷配置,均是"无效"的选择。This paper attempts to build a credit investment decision - making model of commercial banks, when given incomplete information. It briefly analyzes that when a credit investor has difficulty making his own investment decisions, it would be wise to follow other investors. Thus, the herding behavior in a credit market of commercial banks is inevitably formed up; Considering the current credit situation of Chinese universities, this paper suggests that neglecting the private information of a herd loan is an ＂effective＂ optimal decision for a single short - term credit investor. But in the long run, it is an ＂invalid＂ choice to all commercial banks or single bank＇s credit allocation.

关 键 词：信贷市场 贝叶斯 羊群行为 

分 类 号：F222[经济管理—国民经济]