基于延期支付的双卖主垄断市场供应链决策  

Optimal inventory decision under delay in payments considering duopolistic retailers' different competitive behaviors

作　　者：邱昊[1] 梁樑[1] 檀大水[1] 

机构地区：[1]中国科学技术大学管理学院,安徽合肥230026

出　　处：《中国科学技术大学学报》2008年第2期163-170,共8页JUSTC

基　　金：国家自然科学基金(70371023);国家杰出青年科学基金(70525001)资助

摘　　要：比较研究了延期支付条件下双卖主垄断市场共同串谋、古诺竞争、主从博弈3种销售商竞争方式对供应链各方决策的影响.研究结果表明,从生产商角度来说,销售商之间采取何种竞争方式对其利润产生有着直接的影响,但并不改变生产商延期支付期限的决策.而从销售商角度看,运营成本高的销售商倾向采取较高的销售价格,运营成本低的销售商则采取较低的销售价格进行竞争,且在主从竞争方式下高成本销售商存在后动优势.The effects of duopolistic retailers＇ different competitive - competition and Stackel berg game under the delay in payments on the optimal decisions of the supplier and the duopolistic retailers themselves were studied. The results indicate that duopolistic retailers＇ different competitive behaviors have no influence upon the optimal delay in payment decision but a great impact on the profit of the supplier and the optimal inventory decision of the retailers. Retailers with low cost prefer low price, while those retailers with high cost prefer high price and have advantages of second-mover in Stackelberg game.

关 键 词：延期支付 双卖主垄断 市场结构 竞争方式 

分 类 号：C931[经济管理—管理学]