统计数据生成过程博弈的分析  

Analysis on Statistical Data Production Process with Game Theory

作　　者：王华[1] 

机构地区：[1]厦门大学台湾研究院,福建厦门361005

出　　处：《中国软科学》2008年第2期40-47,共8页China Soft Science

基　　金：国家自然科学基金项目(70671104)

摘　　要：宏观统计数据的生成过程中涉及众多参与方,彼此之间形成多种博弈格局,综合作用决定了最终统计数据的质量。对基层单位(或地方政府)之间、地方统计部门与地方政府之间以及数据填报单位(下级统计部门)与上级统计部门之间所进行三类博弈的分析结果表明:基层单位的数据填报受利益再分配原则、决策损失程度与惩罚力度的影响;加大统计检查概率以及对统计造假的惩处力度,可望遏止地方政府的干预、促进地方统计部门实报,而推行统计体系内的垂直管理体制改革则具有更大的可操作性;统计处罚与奖励、完善政府绩效考核机制、赋予统计数据用户以充分的监督权力,都是统计监督博弈中应考虑采取的对策。There e many organizations participating in statistical data production process. The paper analyses the game action between those organizations, which decide the quality of statistical data. The outcome with game theory argues that： （1） the quality of data product in basis level has been subject to the manner of interest reallocation, decision - making loss and punishment for falsification action; （2） intensifying the check - up for data quality and punishment can hold back the interference from local government in a certain extent, while reforming statistical management system will play a more important role; （3） in statistical supervising game, punishment and encouragement, improving assessing mechanism of government performance, and endowing users of statistical data with more power for supervising statistical departmeut should be considered.

关 键 词：统计数据 统计数据质量 博弈 

分 类 号：C811[社会学—统计学] C829.22