中国证券市场监管的最优策略——一个博弈视角的结论  

The Optimal Strategy of the Supervision Mode of China's Securities Market——A Conclusion from the View of Game Theory

作　　者：马改云[1] 

机构地区：[1]暨南大学经济学院,广东广州510632

出　　处：《改革与战略》2008年第2期55-57,71,共4页Reformation & Strategy

摘　　要：文章从博弈论的视角,分析了中国证券市场监管的效率。根据证券市场本身的层次,文章构建了一级发行市场中的寻租合谋监管博弈模型和二级交易市场中的混合策略监管博弈模型。根据这些模型分析的结果,可以得出如下的结论:在给定目前中国证券市场监管博弈规则的条件下,监管者和被监管者的最优策略反而导致中国证券市场的低效率;中国证券市场效率的提高,关键在于对目前监管博弈规则的改进。The efficiency of China＇s securities market supervision is analyzed from the view of the game theory. By considering the structure of the security market, the game model of seeking-rent supervision for the publishing market and the model of mixed strategies for the trading are designed. From these models, a significant conclusion is made： under the conditions of the current game regulations of China＇s securities market supervision, the optimal strategy for the supervisors and the supervisees is resulted in a low efficiency of China＇s securities market. What is the most important now is that the authorities have to perfect its current game regulations in order to improve China＇s securities market.

关 键 词：监管博弈 寻租 混合策略 

分 类 号：F127.8[经济管理—世界经济]