业绩指标、业绩风险与高管人员报酬的敏感性  

Performance index,Performance risk and Pay-performance sensitivity

作　　者：陈震[1] 张鸣[2] 

机构地区：[1]中南财经政法大学会计学院,430073 [2]上海财经大学会计学院,200433

出　　处：《会计研究》2008年第2期47-54,共8页Accounting Research

摘　　要：本文论述了通过提高高管人员报酬——业绩敏感性来激励高管人员努力工作,要受到业绩指标选择和业绩风险大小的影响。针对我国上市公司的实证研究发现,在控制公司规模、股权结构和公司成长性因素后,上市公司高管人员报酬契约能够针对高管人员职责的不同,合理选择业绩指标的报酬——业绩敏感性。但是,实证研究没有发现业绩风险大小对高管人员报酬——业绩敏感性有影响的证据。This text has proved that the consistency of senior executives' pay and shareholders' interests,namely pay-performance sensitivity,must not improve company's performance.Attempt to improve company's performance through raising senior executives' pay-performance sensitivity should be determined by two factors:performance index and performance risk.Research to the medical & biological listed companies in China,we find that there is the different pay-performance sensitivity on different performance index and there isn't consideration on performance risk in the agreement.

关 键 词：业绩指标 业绩风险 报酬——业绩敏感性 

分 类 号：F249.24[经济管理—劳动经济] F224[经济管理—国民经济]