声誉机制、信任机制与小额信贷  

Reputation Effect,Trust Mechanism and Microfinance

作　　者：赵岩青[1] 何广文[1] 

机构地区：[1]中国农业大学经济管理学院金融系

出　　处：《金融论坛》2008年第1期33-40,共8页Finance Forum

摘　　要：小额信贷之所以在不需要抵押担保的情况下也能为借款者放款,究其原因,除了贷款者所实施的信贷规范起到了降低风险的作用以外,建立在"声誉效应"基础上的信任机制作用的发挥起到了关键性的作用,如果借贷双方以及借款联保小组成员间缺乏基本的信任,那么合作行为是不会出现的。本文对建立在声誉效应基础上的信任机制所发挥的作用进行动态博弈分析,在此基础上根据实地调研的数据进行实证剖析,提出了通过借贷双方长期博弈建立信任关系、不断投入资源以维护信任机制、发挥农业保险与专业组织的作用降低农户经营风险等政策建议。Why can borrowers get the loan in the form of microfinance without the collateral and pledge？ Besides the reduction of their risks restrained by lenders＂ credit rules, the trust mechanism based on reputatian effect also plays a key role. The cooperation between the lender and the borrower or among the group lending members will not realize in the absence of trust. The paper explores the effects of trust mechanism from the angle of dynamic game theory and then exerts an empirical analysis with the data obtained from a spot investigation. Finally, the authors put forward several policy suggestions, such as establishing a trust relationship between the borrower and the lender through a long-term repeated game, constantly putting in resources to maintain ＂such trust mechanism and strengthening the roles of agriculture insurance and relevant professional organizations to decrease farmer＇s operation risks.

关 键 词：信任机制 声誉效应 小额信贷 动态博弈 

分 类 号：F832.4[经济管理—金融学]