改革预期、动态博弈与专项中央银行票据兑付  

Reform Expectations,Dynamic Game and the Cashing of Special Central Bank Bill

作　　者：杨俊凯[1] 

机构地区：[1]西北农林科技大学经济管理学院,陕西杨凌712100

出　　处：《金融研究》2008年第2期33-41,共9页Journal of Financial Research

摘　　要：专项票据是新一轮农村信用社改革中主要的资金支持方式。本文通过分析认为,中央银行在专项票据兑付考核中建立的"威胁"具有不完全可置信,农村信用社对改革及专项票据的兑付存有强烈的预期,专项票据兑付是中央银行与农村信用社间的完全但不完美信息动态博弈,博弈的结果取决于中央银行设立的"威胁"的可信性,较低的"威胁"将引致农村信用社较高的作假行为,达不到"花钱买机制"的改革目标。为此,中央银行要提高"威胁"的置信度,降低农村信用社对专项票据兑付的预期,激励农村信用社通过真实努力深化改革,实现改革方案设计的目标。Special bank bill is the main fund resources for supporting new round reform of Rural Credit Co-operatives. The author considers that, the current ＂intimidation＂ of central bank in cashing special bank bill is not totally effective. Rural Credit Co-operative has stronger expectations for the reform and special bank bill cashing, so the cashing of special bank bill becomes a complete but a kind of information asymmetry game between central bank and Rural Credit Co-operatives. The result of the game lles on the creditability of the ＂intimidation＂ of central bank, and less creditability will cause more make-believe actions of Rural Credit Co-operative, which makes the reform object of ＂spend for good mechanism＂ is not viable. Therefore, the central bank must improve its confidence of ＂intimidation＂, and encourage Rural Credit Co-operatives to achieve the designed reform object through deepening reform.

关 键 词：农村信用社 改革 资金支持方案 动态博弈 

分 类 号：F832.2[经济管理—金融学] F224.32