转型社会的政治决策：期权博弈与公平均衡解释  

Political decision of transitional society： An explanation of option game and fairness equilibrium

作　　者：洪开荣[1] 

机构地区：[1]中南大学商学院,长沙410083

出　　处：《Journal of US-China Public Administration》2008年第1期1-5,共5页美中公共管理（英文版）

基　　金：本文得到国家自然科学基金（项目编号：70471048）资助

摘　　要：在转型社会中，政治决策是拥有主要政治权力的行政主体，与反映主要群体利益的社会主体之间的博弈均衡。现实的各种政治后果可以从考虑期权价值的延迟均衡和抢先均衡来说明，也可以表现为考虑心理动机的“公平均衡”。在如同海峡两岸博弈这样复杂的均衡组合中，作者推论存在可以称为“虚妄公平”的均衡概念。转型社会的各个主体因此必须寻求“真实公平”策略选择，才能实现真正公平的政治决策目标。In the transitional society, any political decisions are the special game equilibrium between the government agents which own the major political power and the social agents which represent the benefits of the major interest groups. The practical results of various political decisions could be understood by the delay equilibrium and preemption equilibrium including the option value, or the ＂fairness equilibrium＂ strategies including the psychological motive. The writer also demonstrates that there maybe exists ＂false fairness＂ in the cross-strait game, so every agent must search for the ＂true fairness＂ strategy in order to realize the ＂true fairness＂ objective of the political decisions.

关 键 词：转型社会 政治决策 期权博弈 公平均衡 

分 类 号：D60[政治法律—政治学] F830.59[政治法律—中外政治制度]