防范审计合谋之奖惩措施的有效性  

The Effect of Rewarding or Punishing Auditor Agaist Collusion

作　　者：王善平[1] 赵国宇[1] 

机构地区：[1]湖南大学会计学院,湖南长沙410079

出　　处：《系统工程》2008年第1期110-113,共4页Systems Engineering

摘　　要：奖励或惩罚审计师是监管机构防范审计合谋常用的两种措施,但这两种措施是否有效或者哪一种措施更有效呢?对此问题,本文建立委托代理模型,以数理分析的方法进行研究,研究的结论表明,奖励审计师不能有效防范审计合谋,但惩罚措施是有效的。Rewarding or punishing auditor is a common measure to prevent him or her from participating in conspiracy. Are this two kinds of measure effective or which one is more effective？ The paper uses a principal-agent model as a frame to analyse the problem. The conclusion is that it is not effective to prevent the auditor from conspiring by rewarding him but it is effective by punishing.

关 键 词：委托-代理 审计合谋 防范 奖励 惩罚 

分 类 号：F239[经济管理—会计学]