不对称信息下基于物流服务质量的供应链协调运作研究  

Study on Supply Chain Coordination Based on Logistics Service Quality with Asymmetric Information

作　　者：赵泉午[1] 张钦红[2] 卜祥智[1] 

机构地区：[1]汕头大学商学院,广东汕头515063 [2]上海交通大学安泰经济管理学院,上海200052

出　　处：《管理工程学报》2008年第1期58-61,共4页Journal of Industrial Engineering and Engineering Management

基　　金：国家自然科学基金资助项目(70272022);广东省自然科学基金博士启动资助项目(06300989)

摘　　要：物流运作中出现的货损货差是影响第三方物流企业服务质量的重要因素。在由制造商和第三方物流企业构成的供应链中,第三方物流企业可以采取措施、付出努力降低货损货差的产生,但其收益却由制造商与其共同享有,因而存在着对第三方物流企业激励不足的问题。本文构建博弈模型求出集中式供应链中第三方物流企业的最优努力水平,设计了分散式供应链中基于完全信息和不完全信息的供应链契约,最后用算例分析验证了模型结论。The freight loss and damage is an important factor that influences the service quality of Third Party Logistics provider（TPL）.In the supply chain composed with a manufacturer and TPL,the TPL＇s efforts can reduce the freight loss and damage rate.But the benefits derived from the reduction of freight loss and damage is primarily occupied by the manufacturer,so there is not enough incentive for TPL.In this paper,we build game theory model and get the optimal systemic efforts of the centralized supply chain and the optimal contracts of the decentralized supply chain.At last we consider the optimal contracts when there is asymmetric information about the TPL＇s cost pattern.

关 键 词：供应链协调 第三方物流 货损货差 信息不对称 

分 类 号：F253.4[经济管理—国民经济]