投资机会(IOS)设定下公司内部治理对经营绩效的影响--基于中国上市公司的经验研究  

The Effect of Corporate Internal Governance on Operating Performance under IOS:Based on Empirical Evidences of China's Listed Companies

作　　者：韩志丽[1] 杨淑娥 史浩江[3] 

机构地区：[1]西安交通大学管理学院,陕西西安710049 [2]上海外贸学院,上海201600 [3]广东商学院,广东广州510320

出　　处：《管理工程学报》2008年第1期72-77,共6页Journal of Industrial Engineering and Engineering Management

基　　金：国家自然科学基金资助项目(70672054)

摘　　要：传统的公司治理研究将处于不同组织环境的企业等同对待,造成了研究结论的较大分歧。本文依据投资机会集(IOS)理论,运用我国上市公司的经验证据,在设定投资机会集的条件下,考察了不同成长性的企业其公司治理对经营绩效的影响。研究结果表明:成长性较高的公司,其经营绩效的改善与独立董事比例、高管层的持股比例显著正相关,但与高管层年薪相关关系不显著;成长性较低的公司,其经营绩效的提高与独立董事比例和高管层的持股比例相关关系均不显著,但与高管层年薪存在弱的正相关关系。In the traditional corporate governance investigation,companies in different organizational environment were studied equally,so previous research has been mixed.Based on IOS theory,we examine the effect of corporate internal governance on operating performance under investment opportunity set.Using a sample of growth and non-growth firms in Chinese market,we find： firstly,as for growth firms,the coefficient between improvement in firm performance and proportion of independent directors on the board is positive and significant;the coefficient between improvement in firm performance and increasing shares of top-management is positive and significant;the coefficient between improvement in firm performance and top-management remuneration insignificant.Secondly,as for nongrowth firms,the coefficient between improvement in firm performance and proportion of independent directors on the board is insignificant;the coefficient between improvement in firm performance and increasing shares of top-management is insignificant;the coefficient between improvement in firm performance and topmanagement remuneration is weakly positive and significant.

关 键 词：公司治理 代理问题 投资机会集(IOS) 成长指数 

分 类 号：F403[经济管理—产业经济]