政府的性质：新制度经济学的视角  

Nature of the Government in the Perspective of New Institutional Economics

作　　者：吴金群[1] 耿依娜[2] 

机构地区：[1]浙江大学经济学院,浙江杭州310027 [2]浙江工业大学政治与公共管理学院,浙江杭州310023

出　　处：《浙江大学学报（人文社会科学版）》2008年第2期57-66,共10页Journal of Zhejiang University:Humanities and Social Sciences

基　　金：国家社会科学基金资助项目(06BZZ028)

摘　　要：政府起源于一系列有形或无形契约的签订。在这一契约网络中,公民与政府之间形成了政治委托代理关系,其委托代理链条可以描述为公民—立法者与政治家—行政官僚。因为政治代理问题的广泛存在,所以需要一整套制度安排来协调公民、立法者与政治家、行政官僚之间的关系,这套制度安排就是政府治理结构。然而,政府治理结构并不能完全解决政治代理问题,这就迫使人们对政府的规模与范围作出合理的选择。There are many similar institutional characteristics between government and firm. We try to review the nature of the government, which can be seen as a super-firm in the perspective of institutional economics, especially in the modern corporate theory. Government is a result of rational selection of mankind. In this procession, a series of tangible or intangible contracts were signed or an institutional network was formed. In this institutional network, there is a political principal-agent relationship between the people and the government. The principal-agent chain can be described as people-lawmakers and politicians--administrative bureaucrats. In contrast with the economic principal-agent relationship, political principal-agent relationship is more complex. First, the practical principal-agent chain may not be very clear. Second, the government has plenty of goals, which will confront with each other. Third, incentive for political agents will not be much enough because of the phenomenon of multitask or multi-principal agency. Fourth, there are more adverse selections and moral hazards in political principal-agent relationship than in economic principal-agent relationship. Fifth, political contracts are more incomplete than economic contracts, because the uncertainty of politics is stronger. Sixth, there is little exit mechanism for political principles. Meanwhile, there is little effective competition mechanism among political agents. Therefore, political principal-agent problems are more serious than economic principal-agent problems. In order to solve political principal-agent problems, people need a complete set of institutions to coordinate the relationship of people, lawmakers, politicians, and administrative bureaucrats. These institutions, such as referendum, agent selection, contract design, power balance, supervision, and ideological restriction, can be named governmental governance structure. However, the governmental governance structure can not solve political principal-agent problems completely.

关 键 词：政府起源 政治委托代理关系 政府治理结构 政府边界 

分 类 号：F062.6[经济管理—政治经济学]